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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Whether the trial court properly enforced the 
indemnity agreement against Mr. Ollivier as indemnitor, in light 
of Mr. Ollivier's failure to notify Western Surety of his 
purported intent to withdraw as indemnitor. 
2. Whether the trial court properly found that Mr. 
Ollivier was not entitled to unilaterally terminate his 
obligations under the indemnity agreement solely by concluding 
his business relationship with the principal. 
3. Whether the trial court properly found that Western 
Surety was not legally obligated to annually renew the indemnity 




This court has jurisdiction over this appeal by virtue 
of the order of the Utah Supreme Court dated November 6, 1987, 
and Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(h) (1987). 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS L 
This is an appeal from the judgment entered on August 
31, 1987, by the Honorable Boyd L. Park, Fourth District Court 
Judger in favor of respondent Western Surety Company and against 
appellant Joseph F. Ollivier on Western Surety Company's 
third-party complaint for indemnification. 
STATEMENT OP THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Respondent is satisfied with appellant's statement. 
B. Statement of Facts 
1. On December 1, 1978f respondent Western Surety 
Company ("Western Surety"), as surety, issued a motor vehicle 
dealer's bond to Herf's Heritage Motors, Inc., as principal. The 
bond is reproduced at A-l. 
2. In conjunction with the issuance of said bond, 
appellant Joseph F. Ollivier ("Ollivier"), among others, signed 
an Application for Bond ("indemnity agreement"), an integral part 
of which contains provisions for the indemnification of Western 
Surety on the bond. (Findings of Fact Nos. 1 and 5, reproduced 
at A-5; Trial Trans, p. 135, reproduced at A-9.) The Application 
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for Bond is reproduced at A-4. 
3. At the time Ollivier signed the indemnity 
agreement, he was a shareholder in Heritage Motors and providing 
financial support to Heritage Motors. (Findings of Fact Nos. 2, 
4; Trial Trans, pp. 96-97, reproduced at A-10 and 11.) 
4. At the time Ollivier signed the indemnity 
agreement, he possessed a substantial educational and business 
background (Trial Trans, pp. 92-94, 137, reproduced at A-12 to 
15.) 
5. Sometime in 1982, Ollivier no longer intended to be 
affiliated with Heritage Motors. (Trial Trans, p. 113, 
reproduced at A-16.) 
6. Ollivier never notified Western Surety of any 
intent on his part to withdraw as indemnitor under the indemnity 
agreement, (Trial Trans, p. 108, reproduced at A-17), and never 
notified Western Surety of the termination of his business 
interests with the principal Heritage Motors. (See Appellant's 
Brief, p. 2.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court properly found Western Surety entitled 
to indemnification from appellant Ollivier under the terms and 
conditions of the indemnity agreement signed by Ollivier. Under 
governing law, the indemnity agreement was to be terminated at the 
will of either party and only by clear and unequivocal notice to 
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the other party. It is undisputed that neither Western Surety 
nor Ollivier gave such notice. Therefore, the agreement was 
never terminated. 
The mere fact that Ollivier concluded his business 
relationship with the principal to the underlying bondf which 
fact was also not disclosed to Western Surety, does not somehow 
terminate his contractual relationship with Western Surety. Such 
an argument is contrary to case law as well as fundamental 
principles of contract. Moreover, the fact that the terms of the 
bond required annual premiums did not impose a similar 
requirement of an annual renewal of the separate indemnity 
agreement in the absence of such terms in said agreement. 
Finally, Western Surety is entitled as a surety to the 
protection for which it bargained in the indemnity agreement. 
Western Surety reasonably expected that the extent of the 
indemnity obligation was to be the same as the outer limits of 
its own risk exposure with respect to the bond. It is only fair 
and reasonable to require Ollivier to provide the same clear and 
unequivocal notice of withdrawal from his obligation that Western 
Surety would be legally obligated to provide in the event it 
sought to withdraw as surety. In the absence of such notice, 





THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ENFORCED THE DULY 
EXECUTED INDEMNITY AGREEMENT IN THE ABSENCE 
OF AN EFFECTIVE TERMINATION OR REVOCATION 
OF THE AGREEMENT. 
A. Where An Indemnity Agreement Does Not Expressly 
Limit Its Duration, It Is A Contract Terminable At 
Will Upon Notice of Either Party. 
While the appellant draws this Court's attention to the 
indemnity agreement's silence relative to its duration and 
termination, the appellant wholly fails to direct this Court to 
the applicable rule of law: 
nA contract of indemnity continues in 
force only during such time as is 
expressly or impliedly provided for in 
the contract, and if no such time is 
fixed for its duration, it is a contract 
terminable at the will of either party." 
41 Am. Jur. 2d, Indemnity, Section 8 (1968). The Utah Supreme 
Court has adopted this rule and has further held that such 
termination "must be with notice to the other party which is 
clear and unequivocal." Insurance Company of North America v. 
Lanseair Travel Agency, Inc., 617 P.2d 366, 368 (Utah 1980).1 
See also, Consolidated Theatres v. Theatrical Stage E.U.L., 447 
P.2d 325 (Cal. 1968), an often-quoted case in regards to the 
duration of contracts generally when no express term exists in 
the contract itself. The court stated at page 335: [continued on 
page 5.] 
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In his unsuccessful motion for summary judgment in the 
trial court, the appellant himself referred to this general rule 
as "encyclopedia lawf" arguing that the indemnity agreement 
clearly provided that the duration of the agreement was the 
one-year term applicable to the underlying bond. On appeal, 
appellant now argues the opposing view and emphasizes the 
uncertainty and ambiguity in the agreement relative to its 
duration. Contradiction aside, neither of appellant's arguments 
properly apply the acceptable general rule. 
In Insurance Company of North America v. Lanseair Travel 
Agencyy Inc., supra, a travel agency ("principal") entered into a 
ticket agency contract with an association of airline carriers, 
who required the principal to provide a surety bond. An 
insurance company ("surety") issued a bond on condition that both 
the principal and its president, in his individual capacity, 
execute an indemnity agreement. Just before the annual bond 
premium was due, the president sold his ownership interest in the 
principal and requested by letter that the association inform the 
[Continued from page 4] 
"In such cases, the law usually implies 
that the term of the duration shall be at 
least a reasonable time, and that 
obligations under the contract shall be 
terminable at will by any party upon 
reasonable notice, after such reasonable 
time has elapsed." [Emphasis added.] 
-5-
surety that he would no longer be personally liable on the bond. 
The letter was never received and the surety was never notified. 
Owing to financial problems, the principal never paid 
the annual premium and the airline carriers began filing claims 
against the bond for losses on ticket sales. The surety paid the 
claims and subsequently sued the former president as indemnitor 
under the indemnity agreement. The indemnitor argued in defense 
that he was not liable under the agreement since (1) it had been 
revoked and (2) it had expired due to non-payment of premiums. 
The trial court enforced the agreement and held him liable as 
indemnitor. The Supreme Court affirmed, finding (1) that the 
surety never received the required notice of revocation and (2) 
that the bond had not automatically expired upon non-payment of 
premiums but had continued in force for thirty days thereafter, 
under the terms of the agreement, during which time the losses 
occurred. 617 P.2d at 368. 
In this case, the appellant argues that since the 
indemnity agreement in question did not expressly limit its 
duration or define the method for its termination, he should 
somehow be excused from providing Western Surety with the 
required notice of his revocation. Such an argument is neither 
fair nor reasonable under the circumstances and runs contrary to 
the applicable rule of law relied upon in Lanseair Travel Agency 
and upon which the appellant himself had earlier relied. 
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A review of the indemnity agreement in the Lanseair 
Travel Agency case shows the relevant language to be very similar 
to the agreement in question here. Specifically, there is no 
express limitation on the duration of the agreement. Rather, the 
Lanseair agreement merely provided in pertinent part as follows: 
"In consideration of the inclusion of the 
undersigned in the Schedule Bond as 
aforesaid, the undersigned agrees to. . . 
fully indemnify and save Surety harmless 
from and against all loss, costs, 
charges, suits, damages, counsel fees and 
expenses of whatever kind or nature which 
the Surety shall sustain or incur or be 
put to, by reason or in consequence of 
the Surety having included the 
undersigned in the aforesaid Schedule 
Bond, or any continuation thereof or any 
successory obligation in the same or a 
different amount;. . .n 
617 P.2d at 368. In concluding that such terms bound the 
indemnitor "until the agreement was properly revoked or 
terminated," the court expressed no concern over the agreement's 
silence relative to its duration and termination. The court 
never considered the agreement as uncertain or ambiguous. 
Instead, the court simply cited and relied upon the general rule 
set forth in 41 Am. Jur. 2d, Indemnity, Section 8 (1968), that an 
indemnity agreement is revocable at will upon notice by either 
party. 617 P.2d at 368. 
In this case, the relevant language in the agreement in 
question provides in pertinent part as follows: 
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"The undersigned applicant and 
indemnitors hereby request WESTERN SURETY 
COMPANY, (the Company) to become surety 
for and furnish the above bond and such 
other bonds as may now or hereafter be 
required by or on behalf of the 
applicant. 
The undersigned. . .jointly and severally 
in consideration of the Company becoming 
surety, or executing or guaranteeing any 
bond for the applicant, do for value 
received hereby covenant, promise and 
agree to pay the Company the usual 
premium, and jointly and severally agree 
and indemnify and keep indemnified the 
Company from and against any liability, 
and all loss, cost, charges, suits, 
damages, counsel fees and expenses 
whatsoever which the Company shall at any 
time sustain or incur, for or in 
consequence of the Company having become 
surety or entering into such bond. . .." 
[Emphasis added.] 
These terms clearly suggest, as did those at issue in Lanseair 
Travel Agency, that the indemnity agreement provides a continuing 
obligation not necessarily limited to a single bond. Moreover, 
in absence of an express provision relative to its duration or 
termination, the obligations thereunder are to continue unless 
and until either (1) termination by either party upon notice, or 
(2) termination of the underlying bond. 
B. Appellant's Withdrawal From the Principal's Business 
Did Not Revoke or Terminate the Indemnity Agreement. 
Appellant argues that "it is logical and reasonable to 
rule that Mr. Ollivier's contract for indemnity ended at the end 
of the year he withdrew from any ownership interest in the 
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business [of the principal].11 See Appellant's Brief, p. 4-5. 
Appellant seems to be asking this court to rule, as a matter of 
law, that an indemnitor must be required to have an economic 
interest in a principal before indemnifying the principal's 
surety on the bond. Such an argument cannot be supported by the 
terms of this agreement, statutory or case lawf or the ordinary 
course of dealing in indemnification agreements. 
In Aetna Insurance Company v. Buchanon, 369 So.2d 351 
(Fla. App. 1979), the court held that an individual indemnitor 
should not be entitled to unilaterally terminate his obligation 
under an indemnity agreement on the sole basis that his business 
relationship with the principal had terminated. In that case, as 
in this one, the court was dealing with an indemnity agreement 
that was silent as to the means of its termination. The court 
found no ambiguity by reason of the agreement's silence and 
simply concluded: 
"It seems obvious to us that the parties 
intended, and certainly the surety 
expected, that the extent of the 
indemnity obligation was to be the same 
as the outer limits of the surety's risk 
exposure with respect to the bond. To 
say than an indemnitor under such an 
arrangement may unilaterally cancel any 
further indemnity obligation on his part 
while the bond remains in effect would 
contradict the clear provisions of the 
indemnity agreement and undermine the 
protection for which the surety 
bargained." 369 So.2d at 354. 
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In response to the indemnitor's defense that it would be "absurd 
and unconscionable" to leave him exposed to liability for the 
conduct of a principal with whom he had severed business 
relations, the court responded: 
"This is not an absurd or unconscionable 
result but the foreseeable consequence of 
[the indemnitor's] assumption of the 
indemnity obligation. We can find no 
authority for the proposition that an 
individual who undertakes an obligation 
as indemnitor on behalf of a principal to 
whom he then has a business relationship, 
thus making the arrangement advantageous 
to bothy should be entitled to terminate 
that obligation when the business 
relationship has ended and the 
arrangement is no longer beneficial to 
the indemnitor. His motive for 
undertaking the obligation may no longer 
exist, and indeed he may have every 
reason in the world for desiring to 
relieve himself of the obligation, but he 
nevertheless remains bound by the clear 
language of the agreement." 369 So.2d at 
354. [Emphasis added.] 
In Lanseair Travel Agency, the Utah Supreme Court 
expressly required that the individual indemnitor, who had 
similarly sold his ownership interest in the principal, to 
provide "clear and unequivocal" notice to the surety before 
effectively revoking the agreement. The court added: "it is fair 
and reasonable that the indemnitor can absolve himself from 
liability only after giving the surety reasonable time to secure 
a release from its own liability." 617 P.2d at 368. 
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In this casef the appellant indemnitor admits that he 
"did not notify Western Surety of the termination of his business 
interest with Heritage Motors." See Appellant's Brief, p. 2. 
Furthermore, it is undisputed that appellant never notified 
Western Surety of his intentions to revoke or terminate the 
indemnity agreement. Under the foregoing lawr appellant is 
accordingly precluded from denying liability under the indemnity 
agreement. 
C. Appellant's Continuing Obligations Under The 
Indemnity Agreement Were Not Conditioned On An 
Annual Renewal Of The Agreement. 
Appellant argues in passing that Western Surety was 
required to renew its indemnity agreement with the appellant on 
an annual basis. Appellant's Brief, p. 4-5. Appellant provides 
no basis whatsoever for this proposition, aside from implying 
that since the bond required annual premiums, the indemnity 
agreement should require an annual renewal. Such a groundless 
proposition runs directly contrary to the above-quoted general 
rule providing that where an indemnity agreement is silent as to 
its duration, it is a contract terminable at will upon the notice 
of either party. 
Although the appellant may by himself conclude it 
advisable for a surety to annually check on its indemnitors, 
neither he nor this Court may properly impose such a procedure as 
a legal obligation in the absence of statute or contract terms to 
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that effect. Moreover, it should be noted that the indemnity 
agreement in question was signed by the appellant in 1978. The 
appellant did not sell his ownership interest in the principal 
until 1982. The appellant certainly knew or should have known 
that Western Surety Company had no intentions of renewing the 
indemnity agreement on an annual basis and that Western Surety 
considered the application and indemnity agreement a one-time 
transaction that would remain in full force and effect so long as 
2 
the bond or successive bonds remained in effect. As such, the 
indemnity agreement becomes a contract terminable upon clear 
notice by either party. Insurance Company of North America v. 
Leanseair Ticket Agency, Inc., supra. 
Unlike the factual situation in Lanseair Ticket Agency, 
the underlying bond in this case was never terminated. There is 
no question as to whether the annual premiums had been paid at 
the time the losses occurred. The bond continued in full force 
and effect without regard to the appellant's business dealings, 
all the while subjecting Western Surety to potential liability 
for claims against the bond. In order for Western Surety to 
withdraw as surety on the bond, it would have been required to 
See generally, Holmgren v. Utah Idaho Sugar Company, 582 P.2d 
856 (Utah 1978), wherein the court recognized that "contracts are 
not void or voidable merely because they may be of long duration 
or last in perpetuity." 582 P.2d at 860. 
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give reasonable notice of withdrawal. The principal would 
naturally be entitled to such notice in order to allow him to 
properly seek and obtain alternative insurance. 
By the same argument, it is only fair and reasonable for 
Western Surety to be entitled to reasonable notice from an 
indemnitor who intends to withdraw, thereby ensuring Western 
Surety the protection for which it bargained and allowing it the 
necessary time to secure its own release from its obligations. 
See, American Surety Company of New York v. Blake, 27 P.2d 972, 
974 (Idaho 1933); Aetna Insurance Co. v. Buchanon, supra, 369 
So.2d at 354. There is no disputing the fact that Western Surety 
was never given such notice. 
CONCLUSION 
Controlling law, as well as principles of fairness and 
reasonableness, required the appellant to provide Western Surety 
with "clear and unequivocal" notice of termination before 
effectively relieving himself of his legal obligations under the 
indemnity agreement. Appellant admits that he failed to provide 
Western Surety with such notice. Furthermore, appellant's 
termination of his business association with the principal, of 
which appellant also admittedly never notified Western Surety, 
does not under controlling law constitute a termination of the 
indemnity agreement. Finally, the one-year term of the bond did 
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not somehow work to terminate the indemnity agreement which did 
not under its terms require an annual renewal. 
For the foregoing reasons, respondent Western Surety 
Company respectfully requests this Court to affirm the holding of 
the trial court that the indemnity agreement in question was in 
full force and effect at the time of the losses at issue and 
therefore require the appellant Joseph L. Ollivier to indemnify 
Western Surety for the same* 
DATED this IQ^ day of p-£6/li/A-4^1 / 1988. 
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH 
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principal a * d to mo motor VohicU t o t m o t t Adminttlrator) provtdod. howovor, mat no withdrawal t h a i bo. 
oHortivo far any purpoco i#ntii tiafy dayt thall havo oioptod from ond ohor tho rocoipt ol wch no^co by ma 
tend odmtntttrator. ond furthor prouidod mat no withdrawal shaU in onywito oHoct mo llabtm> ol taid 
turoty ar^ttng avf of fraud or fraudulent roproiontotiont or for ony «»o4al»o" ur »»qiation» ol w4 law by 
mo principal horovnder prior to tho expiration ol *uch period M t>iry doyi, rogordlott ol whorhor or not mo 
lott tuffered hot boon reduced to judgment oolore the lopte of tixty dayt. 
S.cjned a*4 «eoied th.t 1 4 t h
 d o y 0 | O Q C « l b o ) r 19 ™ 
fri«^<ipai 
WRSTERM JUKBTY COMPAWf 
Surety 
ATTfST 
L U U r n T u f 
On i h i s ... doy or ' $ L f f o ' e me p«»r .onally came 
_ , to me l^ TL^wn 
one k n o w n t© me to r>e the p«r%on and d e i C t L e d «n and w h o e^fcuted the f o r e g e n g instrument, QI%^ 
ac ' tnow,>dged to me that he #iecu?ed the \ a m e 
(SCAl) 
Notary Public 
Con-.m»*"non Empires . . 
PARTNERSHIP OR FIRM ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF PRINCIPAL 
ST4TE CF UTAH 
COUNTY Of 
On T h i s .... day of 1 ° . before mo portonotty a p p e a r e d 
. . f© m« k n o w n 
o n d k n o w n »o mo to bo ono of tho f i rm of -~ « —« 
devenbed m ond w h o •xocutod tho some as a n d for the act o n d dood uf said f i rm . 
iS£AO ;* ;. . . . ^ 
N o t a r y Public 
Comn%ss»on Expires 
CORPORATE ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF PRINCIPAL 
STATE OF UTAH 
* t t 
C O U N T Y O f ^ ... . . . 
O n tho d a y of ^ . . . . . . . . , in the year ^ j b o f c r o * * * p j r -
tonally como .. _
 # 10 m# known* who, 00*19 by mtm 
oViry i w g r n , d id dopoto ond toy? That Ho rot idot in &»>,,, ^—+ i b o t no ift 
d o t e n b o d in o n d which oaocutod m o abovo int t rumont; m o t ho know fho tool of said corporat ion* tha t m o t o o l . 
o f f tsod to *a»d int trumont w o t M K H corporafo too l ; m o t it w o t *o of f txod by order of m o too**? o f D t r o d o t v 
of t o i d corporat ion, o n d m o t Ho uo,rtod Hi t nomo moroto by Uko or dor. 
r'. ' j 
(SEAL) 
Cor*m«tt»on Esptrot ... . _ _ . N o t a r y P u b l k 
COtPOtATi ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF PRINCIPAL 
(To bo • • M i n i by 
STATE O f U T A H 
C O U N T Y O f _ 
Or* m o doy of ~ _ • Jo m o yoor _# boforo mo por. 
tanaWy aoooorod ... . to mo knowr. , w h o . Doing by aio 
du>v %wo#n. d i d dopoto o n d toy: That ho ro i idot i t . . . . - . • **** ho tt 
the of m o • m o corporat ion 
which • « ecu fed m o abovo . \ * % * m o n t o n d which i t d o t e n b o d thoremj mo» he »»gnod -He obovo monhonod 
mt i ru 'non* on boholf of void corporation; thot ho w o t o v t h o r n o d to do %o by Articlo cf tho A r t i d o t 
of i rKoroorat ion or the %o*d corporation, o n d b / oroor of rho Soord of Di rocton of %aid corporat ion, o n d m o t 
h i t n a n o t u r e o t it thut appoor t >n 'ho obovo int ' rumonf i t b ind ing upon m o corporat ion. 
' .SIAO 
Cammitfc«o«* Expi<ot Notary PuOhc 
AFFIDAVIT Of QUALIFICATION 
SfAU O* CALIh-HSIA 
v | y r i i in* A — 2 
^ . i y . » * * * .> j » r\« nor ^Muro on *XJ«* 
: . . . . . , . , „ ...« „ . \ 3 r t ' . i t . - i n r v W - ^ * i ^ V ,1 % 1 . i m U l i r . . . . ^ . . M M . . . « 
I 1 D B B 
'IT IS UNDERSTOOD AND AGREED THAT THE BOND 
IS AMENDED TO SHOW THE CORRECT NAME OP THE 
PRINCIPAL AS: HERITAGE MOTqRS, INC." 
Nothing herein contained shall be held lo vary, alter, waive or extend any of the terms, limits gr coMfc 
Uon* of the Bond except as hereinabove set forth. 
This Rider becomes efT.Ktive on the lAti l day of December 197JL.<t 
twelve and one minu'c o'clock A M . Standard Time. 
Attached t<» and forming part of Bond
 N o 2381775 Hafri December 1 4 t h ta 78 
issued b) the WESTERN SL'RETY COMPANY OF SIOUX FALLS. SOUTH DAKOTA, ta 
Herf^s Heritage Motors, Inc . _
 M 
Signed this . 18th ^ y
 0f December it7j§ 
IM 
V. E S T E R N S U R E T Y C O M P A N Y 
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TERRY M. PLANT 
HANSON, DUNN, EPPERSON & SMITH 
A Professional Corporation 
Attorneys for Western Surety Company 
650 Clark Learning Office Center 
175 South West Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: 363-7611 
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RECEiVZ.: 
HANSON, DUNN 
JEEggON* SMITH -. -i 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OP UTAH 
h+*mU+±4X\ II i <<li • A * - ^ y i i f ii IT< [iMbAMA6fc«ri 11 n iia^*a«*yfc<*«a^*««^^b«***i»^Awi**M^a^ys«M*dta i t ff trm*—****r i m r 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 71286 
ALLSTATE ENTERPRISES, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
GLENN WILLIAM HERIFORD, 
HERITAGE MOTORS, and 
WESTERN SURETY COMPANY, 
Defendants. 
Mill m**mm**+*m*m+-mm+*+±+*m+m±4t^mm*m*4Jmmm4*mmmmm*mmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmm. 
WESTERN SURETY COMPANY, 
Third-Party Plaintiff, 
-vs-
JAN L. HERIFORD, JOSEPH F. 
OLLIVIER and LINDA S. OLLIVIER, 
This matter having come before the Court for trial on 
May 7, 1987, the plaintiff Allstate Enterprises, Inc. having 
settled and resolved its claim prior to trial and said settlement 
reflected in a separate document. The trial between third-party 
A-5 
plaintiff Western Surety Company and third-party defendant Joseph 
P. Ollivier having gone forward; the third-party plaintiff 
Western Surety Company being represented by Terry M. Plant and 
the third-party defendant being represented by Allen K. Young, 
and the Court having heard evidence and argument of counsel 
enters the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law* 
FXNDINGSLQF, FACT 
1. That the Application for Bond and attached 
financial statement marked Exhibits 3 and 5, respectively, were 
signed by third-party defendant Joseph F. Ollivier. 
2. That Mr. Ollivier1s involvement with the business 
of Heritage Motors was to provide financial support to the 
business. 
3. That an integral part of the automobile business 
was the obtaining of a motor vehicle dealer bond since said bond 
is required by law before business can be done as an automobile 
dealer. 
4. That Joseph F. Ollivier knew that his role with the 
business was to provide financial support for the business which 
included the financial support needed for the issuance of the 
Western Surety bond in question. 
5. That the indemnification provisions found on 




6. That since Mr. Ollivier signed Article 3, he cannot 
escape the language of the Application for Bond which requires 
him to imdemnify Western Surety. 
7. That Western Surety had no obligation to make an 
annual renewal of the indemnification agreement as long as annual 
premium payments are made. There is no necessity for Western 
Surety to renew the application and indemnity agreement every 
year. 
8. That the third-party defendant Joseph Ollivier has 
substantial education and business background. Given his 
background, he knew or should have known of the impact of the 
indemnification language contained in Exhibit 3, Application for 
Bond. 
1. That Western Surety is entitled to judgment against 
the third-party defendant Western Surety in accordance with the 
terms and conditions of the indemnification agreement signed by 
third-party defendant Joseph Ollivier and marked Exhibit 3 
hereto. 
2. That said judgment will include all monies which 
defendant Western Surety has paid to Allstate Enterprises in 
settlement of the claim against Western Surety under the bond 
which total $9,000. Further, Western Surety shall be entitled to 
recover attorney's fees, costs, and all other expenses associated 
A-7 
-3-
with being a surety and as otherwise set forth in the indemnity 
agreement. 
3. That since Mr. Ollivier signed Exhibit 3, he is 
charged with the legal responsibility of knowing the content of 
the document which requires him to indemnify Western Surety 
Company as set forth in the Conclusion of Law No. 1. 
DATED this &b day of S s ? ^ ^ * 1987. 
BY THE COOI 
ii<flfiUfrt 
5fc 
tiitttt- iiii M I I IONORABLE BOYD L. PARK 




in a normal eguity case* And a surety is not like a 
bank* A bank loan is an entirely different animal than 
one of a surety and an indemnification. Mr. Young has 
done a fine job of the comparison I don't believe they 
are the same animal at all. 
I am concerned and feel some regret because of the 
circumstances and maybe some who would feel a little 
different than I would with regard to the case but 
it appears to me that I have to find that the Application 
for the Bond contains sufficient language for 
indemnification and that signatures thereto once they have-
been accepted by the surety company and a bond has been 
issued you become fixed and they are an integral part of 
the bond. 
I have to believe that it is Mr. Ollivier's signature. 
I can appreciate that he might not remember it but there is 
no evidence to the contrary that it is not his signature 
other than his lack of memory and that he doesnft think 
he would have signed such a thing because he doesnft 
think he would have signed it unless he had read it. He 
may not have read it but that would not allow him to 
escape from the terms of the application and the 
indemnification contained therein because he , if he did 
in fact sign it, and that is a finding of the court that he 
did sign it. 
A-9 
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Q And in fact you became a shareholder in a 
corporation by the name of Heritage Motors did you not? 
A Yes. 
Q What per cent of that business did you own in 
1978? 
A I think that it was 20 per cent I am not positive 
about that because the shares eventually became worthless 
but I think it was 20 per cent. 
Q And you are aware of another claim pending against 
you Valley Bank vs. Western Surety vs. Yourself? 
A Yes. 
Q You know that claim? 
A Yes. 
Q You aware that your attorney has submitted 
a memorandum inrthat case in support of the Motion for 
Summary Judgment have you read that? 
A (no answer) 
Q In that memorandum they indicate that you own one 
third of the business is that closer to your accurate 
or 20 per cent? 
A I probably have to I looked and I couldn't find 
any records or certificates I thought it was 25 per cent 
but you know I could be wrong about that but I believe it 
was 20 per cent. 
Q But nonetheless you were a part owner of the business 
A-10 
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and you knew that? 
A I owned some shares in it. 
Q And that you heard Mr. Heriford testify 
haven't you? 
A Yes. 
Q And you heard him-tell this court that your 
primary purpose for being involved was that he didn't have 
the financial wherewithal to get the business going and he 
relied on your financial strength to do that? 
A To get a loan at Zions Bank yes. 
Q But and you would agree with his statement that I 
just made wouldn't you? 
A Yes he was relying on my financial ability. 
Q Because he had none and was a 27 year old newly-
wed without anything? 
A I didn*-t know that he didn't have anything. I 
knew that he apparently , in our discussions, did not have 
enough to get a flooring line that was what our discussio 
were about. 
Q And so you do recall going to Zions Bank and 
signing a number of documents flooring agreements and 
other such documents whereby you bound yourself to be 
financially responsible for loans and things that which 
were necessary to get the business going didn't you? 




1 Western Surety Company being first duly sworn was examined 
2 and testified as follows: 
3 DIRECT EXAMINATION 
4 BY MR, PLANT: 
5 Q Would you please state your name sir? 
5 A Joseph F. Ollivier. 
7 Q Present address? 
g A 1040 Windsor Drive, Provo, Utah. 
9 Q Presently married? 
10 A Yes. 
H Q To who? 
12 A Allyson, that is my wife's name. 
13 Q How long have you been married to her? 
14 A About 8 months. 
15 Q You were formerlly married to Linda Ollivier were 
16 You not? 
17 A. Yes. 
18 Q From when to when did that marriage last? 
19 A From 1967 until 1982. 
20 Q How many years is that? 
21 A 14 I think , 14 or 15. 
22 Q What do you do for a living? 
23 A I am a stock broker. 
24 Q And you have a degree from some institution? 
25 A Yes I graduated from B.Y.U. 
A-12 
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Q In what? 
A In business I am sorry statistics. 
Q When? 
A In 1965. 
Q How old are you? 
A I am 45. 
Q You just have a Bachelor's degree? 
A Yes. 
Q Any post graduate degrees? 
A Yes. 
Q What? 
A I have a masters in business. 
Q Business Administration? 
A Yes a MBA Degree. 
Q Where was that? 
A From Stanford University. 
Q When? 
A In 1967. 
Q All right and do you work with a brokerage company 
here? 
A Yes, I work for Shearson Lehman Brothers. 
Q How long have you worked for them? 
A Since 1982. 
Q Where did you work before that? 
A For Foster and Marshall which is another brokerage 
A-13 
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firm acquired by Shearson. 
Q When did or how long did you work for Foster and 
Marshall? 
A Since 1979. 
Q Where did you work before that? 
A I worked for a company called Dayne and Bosworth. 
Q That is a brokerage firm also? 
A That is also a brokerage firm also. 
Q How long did you do that? 
A For approximately six years. 
Q You have had a lot of business experience haven't 
you Mr. Ollivier? 
A I have had some yes. 
Q A lot havenft you? 
A In the brokerage business yes. 
Q In the brokerage business you have to sign a 
lot of documents and you have to sign a lot of agreements and 
you have to sign a lot of contracts don't you? 
A I have to sign customer agreements yes. 
Q And you are used to signing documents as a matter 
of course I would imagine? 
A Yes. 
Q And you understand that when you sign a document 
it is implied by law that you have read that document? 
A Yes I believe I do. 
A-14 
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in this particular agreement that bothers me that is my mosjt 
difficult hurdle to get over. However, in view of the 
education of Mr. Ollivier and in view of his business 
experience I am going to have to decide that favor 
of-the bonding company Western Surety. 
So based on that reasoning and those facts it is the 
Judgment of this court that Western Surety have a Judgment 
over against Mr. Ollivier for their amount of money that 
they are obligated to pay under the bond and for such 
costs as they have incurred and reasonable attorney 
fees* Reasonable attorney fees will be submitted by 
affidavit in accordance with our Administrative Order I 
think it is I am not sure 25 but I am not sure what it is. 
You will submit copies to Mr. Young of those affidavits 
so that he can raise any objections that he feels are 
appropriate. 
Also Mr. Plant you will draw the Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Judgment in this matter and submit 
those to Mr. Young under Rule 2.9 and then to the court. 
Anything further? 
MR. PLANT: No Your Honor. 
THE COURT: This is the first case maybe it will 
get a test if there is a lot of them out there. 
MR. YOUNG: Will have to Your Honor. 
THE COURT: May very well I can understand that. 
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1 Q Did anyone ever communicate with you to determine 
2 whether you were still^ f irst of all still associated with 
3 Heritage Motors Inc.? 
4 A No. 
5 Q Did 
6 MR. PLANT: You mean the "world"? 
7 MR. YOUNG: No. 
8 BY MR.YOUNG: 
9 Q Did Western Surety or Blackley Insurance ever 
10 either write you.or call you or communicate with you to 
U determine whether you were still affiliated with Heritage 
12 Motors? 
13 I A No they didn't. 
14 Q Did you intend to be affiliated with Heritage 
15 after 1982? 
16 A No. 
'
7
 Q Had you known you had any obligation what would 
18 you have done? 
19 MR. PLANT: Objection speculation. 
20 THE COURT: Sustained. 
21 MR* YOUNG: I think he can testify about what 
22 he would have done Your Honor unless counsel agreeable to 
23 stipulate that he had no obligation or orally stipulate 
24 Mr. Ollivier knew that he had no obligation? 
25 T H E COURT: Well I don't, he can make a statement 
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Q And you knew that was part of your obligation to 
tell them so they knew you weren't going to be a guarantor 
anymore didn't you? 
A Well just telling them wouldn't have done any good. 
I had to make arrangements to have the loan paid off. 
Q To go through that procedure to take care of 
getting off the loan? 
A Yes. 
Q Because you knew that they relied on you and 
your financial ability in making their loans? 
A Right well the^ relied on me as a coquarantor. 
They dealt really with Mr. Heriford but relied on me 
somewhat. 
Q Your money right? 
A Relied on my financial strength in c^ se- of 
a oroblem. 
Q Did you ever notify western Surety that you were 
no longer willing to.serve as an indemnitor under the 
Application for Bond? 
A I didn't know if Western Surety existed until abou|t 
six months ago. 
Q Did you ever notify them of any intent on your Dart 
not to be an indemnitor in behalf of Heritage Motors 
Inc.? 
A No. 
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